2026-09-13T15:53:01Z https://njump.me https://njump.me/npub1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqzqujme https://njump.me/r/ynostr.yael.at/tango https://yael.at/img/redYO.jpg https://yael.at/img/redYO.jpg https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqvmuhhny3x3uhdk2pr33a3z86zqdhf7peydwf0adf7crhpfsqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygwxzzyx In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8snt5zss8yyzm30entc2kcnvdv8p0agd6srp2sskq3qz3z5fy68gpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc402fsl'>nevent1q…2fsl</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Not intentional. Sent the above to team to see if it can be recreated. Some VPN apps may not be playing well to the tighter leak protection. I assume User Profiles are fine? 2026-09-13T15:53:01Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqram0zvcl8fgr5zy2nhrey0xs626udzgva8sk7fdlcf4375esprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygs34zut Secure paste has been merged into #GrapheneOS to provide a replacement for focused apps being able to read the clipboard:<br/><br/><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/435">https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/435</a><br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsqqqqrsagflga3jjfqyk6ptpkak5hj8apxcvpz0apj9my28cvkchgprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygpsgqqqqqqsnlaav9" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…aav9</a></span> </div> We've developed a secure paste feature replacing traditional clipboard APIs in #GrapheneOS. Users will be able to take away clipboard access from apps to use this instead. It integrates into the standard selection toolbar, input methods, accessibility services and keyboard shortcuts. We plan to get it merged soon.<br/><br/>A small subset of apps including those written in Flutter implement their own text selection toolbar. We've worked around this by adding a Paste button to the default keyboard. We'll be replacing AOSP Keyboard with a much better keyboard and will carry over adding this feature to the new one too.<br/><br/>Android only permits the currently focused app and keyboard to read the clipboard. However, sensitive data often lingers around in the clipboard for a while and privacy invasive apps can read it. Android shows a notice for apps reading clipboard content set by other apps but by then it's too late.<br/><br/>Our approach is replacing the inherently problematic API-based clipboard access approach used by both desktop and mobile operating systems. It's another overhaul of the privacy model for apps similar to our Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes features. We have many of these privacy features planned. </blockquote> 2026-09-13T06:06:53Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqd4rtdqgfg99xc85x2hnmfr4g59z2zw2585rsn4vnza4m9pscprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygphppdc In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswv7uhrnxusgemjgsmyzewaxe4u5jdk9x8pyfrg959enutdecra8cpr9mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuumwdae8gtnnda3kjctv9u5jaeq2'>nevent1q…aeq2</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>GrapheneOS App Store app. You may need to change the release channel to get it early (see the three dots at the top right). 2026-09-12T19:17:24Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq2zarl405u0rrnfsklt32vstslp03hnpqs5luehpz0gyhh0scprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygtvletw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqz3xhyjmy40vgp9y5tc7zjx9kqg0xs0hczkcgajpw86yrfynnqpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtct6lhp6'>nevent1q…lhp6</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>GrapheneOS is open source so we expect access to that code to be available to anyone including who we don&#39;t like. There have been malicious forks. Someone could easily mirror the code to GitHub had it not been there already. Someone can also automated mirror the repos from our GitHub and GitLab elsewhere if they don&#39;t like the platforms.<br/><br/>For a lot of open source projects, finding the talent is harder than funding. GrapheneOS is getting kinda popular now so there&#39;s a fan base and funding behind it even if it comes at a consequence of getting mentioned on mainstream news for clicks and hype.<br/><br/>The best developers are obviously living the dream with big tech salaries which no one can blame them for taking it. We have enough to hire multiple people, it&#39;s just they need to fit what developers want and have the GrapheneOS attitude and &#39;culture&#39;. 2026-09-12T12:16:01Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqfmaqpdwrzajsy55fv7n3xer74a9uugete9lejpya2vws7u6gprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygpqsrpa In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrzwt5tly454c0ga27zl5ewqlgva67wzxlxdpfjs0w6k3xt4c3pzcppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0zvmsml'>nevent1q…msml</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>When the overhauled Clock app is worked on it should absolutely be, it&#39;s just the AOSP apps are that old from when standards of what Kyiv was a mess. There&#39;s also some time zones that are missing there. 2026-09-12T11:34:15Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqzt2m2xf0hjfywkfvc6pqzamq2k8n5frwffkfcs0sumqa38ycprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygvcyq72 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqq865hzld46mwcy57pt0yt9ajxj349rzq8re6veq3epckwhr3mspzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcazphfs'>nevent1q…phfs</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can see the individual pull requests for how many people have worked on the app and that there&#39;s people discussing what to do. There&#39;s people involved in every step or the development testing for quality. Here&#39;s the largest:<br/><br/><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/pull/109">https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/pull/109</a><br/><br/>The leading apps dev has around a decade and a half of experience in developing on the Android platform alone. His contributions so far have been incredible.<br/><br/>We have a broad access to many LLMs for security testing, including cyber-enabled models for dual-use. It&#39;s not actually writing the code of GrapheneOS much. It would be poor to willingly dumb ourselves down when companies such as Cellebrite are devoting teams to creating AI tooling to reverse engineer mobile devices to try and exploit them. 2026-09-12T11:29:49Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqzyj2m4e54ef24g7s2qcalmjjfpdzfgjqa2rly4pp92pdkwqgprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygzu4a9d In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8dflys0kcs33ls8ptl4n20wgz23vwxm9ech79hkdmgke46xms7gcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc8huh7n'>nevent1q…uh7n</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Unaware of other open source projects using RCS. However RCS on Android is currently implemented with code across the OS, Google Messages and Google Play services. To start it would require sandboxed Google Play for RCS activation and so on. It would be less reliant, but not entirely separated.<br/><br/>RCS isn&#39;t an open platform at all compared to SMS/MMS. It heavily depends on proprietary Google and carrier infrastructure. We can start by replicating Google&#39;s approach in the messaging app they have and then we can work on only using carrier services for carriers where it&#39;s actually supported to cut that out.<br/><br/>RCS support is simply for added compatibility and feature pairity. People should use a secure messenger not relying on mobile carriers as a first choice, which our messaging app first run tells you about. 2026-09-12T10:33:32Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqqy9crpkpkarc68zgh7x5qgx56w8vq32nsqmglkfsmeg3u48gprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg2lsjvp In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqy2tmwfhg72fj3up5c3t46yraqzafcar0dkvl5da2vsuect7mcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcmpx7wk'>nevent1q…x7wk</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>We haven&#39;t released these in other app stores yet but eventually this could be done when they&#39;re more of a standout app. For the messaging app where we plan to use RCS support this might only work as intended on GrapheneOS, so need to see how we approach it first. 2026-09-12T10:27:21Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq0pt3dkpsmksj9hq45pkld7mgwg6la6sscmw9rcg4js6d7k9gprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygwmkjzw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqverlz603fg633qsma6430qjqy080t8w9yp2pfucu4tg7vny3sprfmhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ycmgv43kktndv5hsl0ud78'>nevent1q…ud78</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Using this as a space to verify myself. (Please ignore).<br/><br/>I own the seed for @final on Stasher News.<br/><br/>This npub is associated to the same username on Stacker News. 2026-09-11T22:25:49Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqyf3gqpgwwnt37xphq3e3wmp20tjq3pphe2vrfvjetrpfer2sprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygnpzjc2 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqst955udhtaakrsau72yqzhr9cxynf5xxju06xt5cu6en56dsgt4tcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcv74uk7'>nevent1q…4uk7</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Was somehow an existing feature in the AOSP messaging app already. 2026-09-11T21:58:20Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqzul55l2n3l950je9xyeu68vxmgh2qsgc8u3st2fla93s8kmqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg5m42zx In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqr8j9kj7rc0q6m8mvh20t2hhzr9zqs3ujptkgpq7u0xlalzzspzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtch2n7xy'>nevent1q…n7xy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can see the full changelog below:<br/><br/>**Intro**<br/><br/>Version 13 replaces the legacy interface with Jetpack Compose and Material 3. It rebuilds every screen, adds new conversation controls and large-screen support, and fixes problems with crashes, notifications, security, and message handling.<br/><br/><br/>**Interface**<br/><br/><br/>- Material 3 / Expressive design with shapes<br/>- Two-pane conversation layout on large screens<br/>- New adaptive app icon with a monochrome variant<br/>- New onboarding covering SMS privacy, permissions, and default-app setup<br/>- Correct display cutout and system bar handling in both orientations<br/><br/><br/>**Conversation list**<br/><br/><br/>- Pin conversations<br/>- Snooze notifications for 1, 8, or 24 hours, or indefinitely<br/>- Mark conversations as unread from the menu or by swiping<br/>- Swipe to archive or unarchive<br/>- Quick actions from conversation avatars<br/>- Redesigned multi-select actions for archiving, deletion, blocking, and notifications<br/>- Indicators for unread, pinned, snoozed, notifications off, work profiles, and incoming MMS status<br/>- Redesigned archive screen<br/>- Pinning, archiving, and deletion now apply immediately<br/><br/><br/>**Conversations**<br/><br/><br/>- Rebuilt message bubbles, grouping, selection, and link handling<br/>- Select multiple messages for deletion<br/>- Full-screen message details with copyable sender, recipients, timestamps, delivery status, size, type, and priority<br/>- SMS segment and character counter<br/>- Add, edit, or remove MMS subjects from the conversation overflow menu<br/>- Blocked-sender banner with an unblock action<br/>- Add participants to existing conversations or create groups from the new-chat screen<br/>- Redesigned recipient picker with alphabetical sections, email addresses, formatted numbers, and multiple numbers per contact<br/>- Emergency numbers cannot be dialed from conversations<br/>- SIM fallback now uses the system default instead of the first SIM<br/>- Top-bar actions for calls, contact cards, and conversation settings<br/>- Attachment limits checked before sending, with visible send errors<br/>- Messages arriving during conversation deletion are no longer destroyed<br/><br/><br/>**Attachments and media**<br/><br/><br/>- Rebuilt media picker with photo and video capture, flash controls, and Android&#39;s embedded photo picker<br/>- Redesigned audio recording with slide-to-cancel and hands-free locking<br/>- Attachment captions<br/>- Rewritten photo viewer with pinch-to-zoom, page indicators, details, and correct system bar handling<br/>- Rewritten vCard viewer with avatars, contact-change refresh, and saving to contacts<br/><br/><br/>**Sharing and forwarding**<br/><br/><br/>- New share picker with search, recent conversations, alphabetical contacts, and multi-select<br/>- Edit shared content, add a subject, preview it, and choose a SIM<br/>- Forwarding and the widget use the same picker<br/>- The widget&#39;s new-message button opens the new-chat screen<br/>- Missing shared text is read from its content URI; missing subjects use the shared title<br/>- Sharing failures are now reported<br/><br/><br/>**Settings**<br/><br/><br/>- Rewritten main, general, and per-SIM settings<br/>- New Privacy section<br/>- Rewritten licenses screen with generated license data<br/>- Existing per-conversation notification settings are preserved<br/><br/><br/>**Privacy and security**<br/><br/><br/>- YouTube link previews are opt-in and disabled by default<br/>- Shared-content validation rejects file: URIs and private app files, and checks content URI permissions<br/>- Shared text read from content URIs receives the same private-file checks<br/>- Widget receivers are no longer exported, and widget intents are restricted to the app<br/>- Pending intents use FLAG_IMMUTABLE where mutability is not required<br/>- Allocation limits added to EXIF APP1, MMS PDU, and MMS content-type parsing<br/>- Fixed GIF null dereferences, missing dimension checks before native transcoding, and signed-character colour corruption<br/>- Updated the AOSP vCard parser with upstream fixes<br/>- Bounded notification people lists, fixing a reported crash<br/>- Onboarding explains that SMS is unencrypted and recommends end-to-end encryption for sensitive messages<br/><br/><br/>**Crash fixes**<br/><br/><br/>- Fixed crashes in the widget, failed SMS database inserts, declined-call quick responses, settings for unsaved numbers, and share intents<br/>- Share intents no longer silently drop attachments<br/><br/><br/>**Messages and notifications**<br/><br/><br/>- Incoming SMS messages are imported immediately<br/>- Failed-message notifications are delivered correctly<br/>- Inline notification replies no longer open the home screen<br/>- Unread notifications survive reboots<br/>- Blocked conversations no longer play notification sounds<br/>- Deleted conversations no longer receive notifications during sync<br/>- Sync no longer overwrites archive changes<br/>- Fixed a race between MMS downloads and notifications<br/>- Pending MMS messages show their subject and download status<br/>- Unknown group senders show their phone number<br/>- Rewritten Class 0 message dialog with correct timeout and lifecycle handling<br/>- Low-storage warnings are dismissible and also appear when the message database is full<br/><br/><br/>**Multiple users and work profiles**<br/><br/><br/>- Secondary-user notifications show message content and use unique IDs<br/>- Secondary users are told that pending MMS must be retrieved by the Owner user; the downloaded messages are then available to all users<br/>- Work-profile conversations are labelled<br/><br/><br/>**Accessibility**<br/><br/><br/>- Screen-reader labels for screens, panes, controls, and rows<br/>- Timestamps announce full weekday names<br/>- Copying message details is available as an accessibility action<br/>- Fixed conversation-list focus and swipe-action state announcements<br/>- Sending a message produces an announcement and sound<br/><br/><br/>**Testing**<br/><br/><br/>- Expanded unit and instrumented tests for the new data, domain, and Compose UI layers<br/>- Tests, builds, and static analysis run on every pull request<br/>- License reports are generated and checked in CI<br/><br/><br/>Updates to dependencies and required platform version:<br/><br/>- minSdk 36<br/>- targetSdk 37<br/>- compileSdk 37<br/>- Android Gradle Plugin 9.3.2<br/>- Kotlin 2.4.10<br/>- Gradle 9.7.1<br/>- Glide 5.0.9<br/>- Guava 33.7.1<br/>- libphonenumber 9.0.38<br/>- Added Compose BOM 2026.08.00, Material 3 Adaptive, Navigation 3, Coil 3, and CameraX<br/><br/><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/13">https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/13</a> 2026-09-11T21:22:38Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqr8j9kj7rc0q6m8mvh20t2hhzr9zqs3ujptkgpq7u0xlalzzsprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygapx9rv The overhauled #GrapheneOS Messaging app is available in our App Store via the Alpha channel.<br/><br/>Our new app development team worked on this for months. It&#39;s now a far better app with much higher quality code. We&#39;ll make a new release based on feedback soon.<br/><br/>We&#39;re going to be overhauling or replacing most AOSP apps in the near future: Calculator, Clock, Contacts, Gallery, Keyboard and Phone.<br/><br/>The apps we created will be overhauled too. PDF Viewer is done and Camera is next. Camera and PDF Viewer will be getting many new features too.<br/><br/>It&#39;s a massive overhaul and may need a few releases to reach the Stable channel. We&#39;re working on a version 14 release fixing issues with the predictive back animation, tapping contacts not always showing the right SIM with dual SIM and some outdated icons/colors we missed.<br/><br/>Messaging will be overhauled even more. We plan to add RCS support with Messaging Layer Security (MLS). That will provide E2EE with contacts using Google Messages or iOS. RCS with MLS can already be used on GrapheneOS via Google Messages but we want to avoid people needing it.<br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsqqqqtqnyt82jyx764naarxwtnw22gvgwsuzdwf87y7sehs7xeu3cpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtczyzucmm2vat4zq7gdhjeux9qqdysqn56v07vj0s5xsddfnd6grfwzyqcyqqqqqqg39d7zt" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…d7zt</a></span> </div> #GrapheneOS messaging, our new redesign of the SMS/MMS messaging app, is now available in the GrapheneOS App Store in Alpha channel.<br/><br/>This is the first of many replacements of default apps we aim to work for. Check it out!!<br/> <img src="https://npub1hxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3q4sg75y.blossom.band/d811b40a6bdf940ff89a8dd5a3c3008afd8f7daafdead66a2184e18dfb5213cb.jpg"> </blockquote> 2026-09-11T21:12:40Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqtqnyt82jyx764naarxwtnw22gvgwsuzdwf87y7sehs7xeu3cprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygkvpy7a #GrapheneOS messaging, our new redesign of the SMS/MMS messaging app, is now available in the GrapheneOS App Store in Alpha channel.<br/><br/>This is the first of many replacements of default apps we aim to work for. Check it out!!<br/> <img src="https://npub1hxx76n82ags8jrduk0p3gqrfyqyaxnrlnynu9p5rt2vmwjq6ts3q4sg75y.blossom.band/d811b40a6bdf940ff89a8dd5a3c3008afd8f7daafdead66a2184e18dfb5213cb.jpg"> 2026-09-11T21:03:47Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqp4zrvu9gv3mlq6x90czelezjslsq9htk04xc82fqsr4a80eqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygvc5znl In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrmgjueyfrksmghavcc9sunh76fxey625t39c3kh497r3lsl736vgpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc3sswfu'>nevent1q…swfu</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Features like that are in the issue tracker to do, don&#39;t worry. Just like I mentioned it won&#39;t defeat the most invasive types of fingerprinting, if there&#39;s data that is randomised they will choose to track on what isn&#39;t instead. 2026-09-08T17:43:33Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqt8k3sqdjw7ctmmu8cmyeusfh5qpg6rjhtc25zsjwc90rwfpsprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygw2z2mh In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqwqykqh95t2zv6r7vm0mv45uxwmxp3z432tdaw8tm5r8gr7ygpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcpe4cqd'>nevent1q…4cqd</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>(would be an edit of above but I know some clients don&#39;t behave well on certain nostr features so they make me use comments, sorry!)<br/><br/>The privacy/resistance score used by CreepJS is a great example of measuring metrics against someone&#39;s attempts of trying to resist/circumvent being fingerprinted. A service could just close someone out of they think a user is &#39;suspicious&#39; enough 2026-09-07T18:19:05Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqwqykqh95t2zv6r7vm0mv45uxwmxp3z432tdaw8tm5r8gr7ygprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg58vq6p In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqtcqmndrau6urx8c2987qes5wgw9jmfdkp67gdeezmz0m7gucpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcs2gf5q'>nevent1q…gf5q</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>^ You can use a browser *designed* for going against it like Brave, but you&#39;ll find one of these tests still continue to work against it. Even the Tor Browser on Mobile does and you have to wipe the browser data / state each time for all of the browsers or timing out a service until they forget about you 2026-09-07T18:16:52Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqtcqmndrau6urx8c2987qes5wgw9jmfdkp67gdeezmz0m7gucprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygl66l7e In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs9svwmfralwwmy320eztyx5ldkgkdghyzrfdw4cz005nggcxggdpgpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtct3pyvp'>nevent1q…pyvp</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>See what was talked about here:<br/><a href="https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5775-device-fingerprinting-test-results-concerns-and-questions/20">https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5775-device-fingerprinting-test-results-concerns-and-questions/20</a> <a href="https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/19692-vanadium-fingerprinting/4">https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/19692-vanadium-fingerprinting/4</a><br/><br/>Disabling the JS wouldn&#39;t actually stop it in practice, because you&#39;d stand out incredibly by the lack of data being provided in comparison to almost everyone else on the planet. The service just isn&#39;t adapted to that scenario and it would be trivially easy to set up a library to do it. You should use web services that respect your privacy and don&#39;t do such nefarious things as a first priority. No browser&#39;s fingerprinting protection works well at all and is highly dependent on having a crowd. On most implementations it&#39;s randomizing data points and hoping that the service admin isn&#39;t smart enough to correlate or to track the points that do not change.<br/><br/>The more invasive a site is about fingerprinting then any resistance towards it is increasingly less possible, final boss being services requiring you to KYC to use it. This would apply even for browsers with strict settings that do not change. Take a look at your display size, locale, timezone, GPU, for example or even benchmarking the device performance. In reality the fingerprint suggests a GrapheneOS user of a certain device with a VPN and it tries to keep that as much as it can which goes under the radar for more naive services. 2026-09-07T18:15:02Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqxye3c53arf4y89x2gcceffr6hyef5f8n5hjf4e0ju06up79cprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygul9ty4 We&#39;re currently making a new OS release to resolve a volume bar UI regression caused by an upstream Android security preview patch found in Alpha. We&#39;ve also fixed a Private Space UI issue.<br/><br/>The major Messaging app release we&#39;ve been working on for months has been slightly delayed to after we make the OS release. Hope you&#39;ll like it!<br/><br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsqqqq8ymvn7cq0mvzuaq4w3j2k6tp80xrta2y6m0vrap6n4cmugnqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygpsgqqqqqqsn6rjs2" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…rjs2</a></span> </div> We're well into the process of converting the Messaging app included in #GrapheneOS into a modern app. We'll be making a new release later today with a completely overhauled user interface written in Android Compose. We've made a massive amount of other improvements and bug fixes beyond that too.<br/><br/>In the longer term, we plan to add support for RCS including support for the standard end-to-end encryption (E2EE) via Messaging Layer Security (MLS). Currently, RCS including E2EE is available on GrapheneOS via Google Messages. We want to avoid the need to use Google Messages for RCS eventually.<br/><br/>RCS on Android is currently implemented with code across the OS, Google Messages and Google Play services. Our plan is to start by making an equivalent to the portion in Google Messages. It would initially require sandboxed Google Play for RCS activation, etc. but we plan to implement that too..<br/><br/>RCS isn't an open platform in practice. It isn't even as open as SMS/MMS. It heavily depends on proprietary Google and carrier infrastructure in practice. We can start by replicating Google's approach and then we can work on only using carrier services for carriers where it's actually supported.<br/><br/>We're also going to be overhauling or fully replacing the rest of the AOSP apps in the near future. AOSP Gallery is incredibly outdated and is being entirely replaced. AOSP Keyboard may be similar. We recently hired a bunch of new people and will be hiring more so our progress will be accelerating.<br/><br/>In the past, our focus was nearly entirely on the base OS rather than bundled apps with alternatives available. We've heavily ramped up the resources we're investing into the bundled apps. We'll also be scaling up our work on the base OS too. More donations will enable us to hire even more people. </blockquote> 2026-09-07T17:34:05Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqphl8u6awjrt9zshg2900jl53fwmesjg9enwrv9hl0fqqsrfqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygnsw9tj In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8fl952j8kg2w6jcw888u3842052635q0vk2empwelq840ssta6nqprdmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhv6trw3hhy83cyax'>nevent1q…cyax</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>When making a new keyboard we want something on par with GBoard, without the whole third party GIF and Google services obviously. There&#39;s a few great contenders already out there with a different license but are incomplete in important features. That&#39;s something we&#39;d have to take on. 2026-09-07T17:15:42Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqwljc9nlgh7s2pux9yys8834jewqrnxde7eg32pzy542zq60sprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygfjl7pe In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsgtqxg43uvspkmpq08z4d5sny7km04wdwcemmvfxz3chgxm6lq5qgpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc0mk6p7'>nevent1q…k6p7</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>GrapheneOS is a separate operating system to whatever Motorola decides to do with their OS. There is no Motorola apps or services to begin with. It&#39;ll be the same OS you see on the Pixels, apps and all. 2026-09-07T16:51:16Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqqjqj4vj9a3u38a0fyfmsl8n87eyyk8y3js3m0ev4tggjlwtgprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg7uswdx Why not both?<br/><br/><a href="https://www.clicks.tech/products/clicks-for-google-pixel">https://www.clicks.tech/products/clicks-for-google-pixel</a><br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsqqqpy2ec8g0v6v907x0afugmmwjdkmlcnt7xw55894t4604zq8agp83mhxue69uhkvet9v3ejumn0wd68yctjvd5xjan9wvhxxmmd9ahx7ar9wvhhgun9dejxjmn89aex2ctrw35k7mnn9a6x7erp0ypzpckv7l8jqspl8u4y54dn9rcduwlrs4v2040nxce0m2h0cunvrj8tqvzqqqqqqy95fdt8" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…fdt8</a></span> </div> This or grapheneOS?<br/> <img src="https://relay.utxo.one/6abf8bc1cc91f27d748130630936c81a0935a4c548ec7f5a6277fc4b705b63b0.jpg"> </blockquote> 2026-09-07T01:08:02Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqdv2euapg2es4ezr4frpqr35utnsrg92n2drtjsu683uq425gprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg8f52hv In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsf04x32r462dgf6wnce9axsxfk7u679vysy2dy6ku803hqz67axkspzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc7wcadf'>nevent1q…cadf</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Not over user profiles, that&#39;s as designed. Private Spaces (user profiles nested in other users) already have our own clipboard sharing rules feature. Worth checking it out.<br/><br/>As for the keyboard we can&#39;t use FUTO due to the licensing. We are definitely trying to have a modern keyboard app inclusive for GrapheneOS. 2026-09-06T20:20:15Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqrsagflga3jjfqyk6ptpkak5hj8apxcvpz0apj9my28cvkchgprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygyas0cz We&#39;ve developed a secure paste feature replacing traditional clipboard APIs in #GrapheneOS. Users will be able to take away clipboard access from apps to use this instead. It integrates into the standard selection toolbar, input methods, accessibility services and keyboard shortcuts. We plan to get it merged soon.<br/><br/>A small subset of apps including those written in Flutter implement their own text selection toolbar. We&#39;ve worked around this by adding a Paste button to the default keyboard. We&#39;ll be replacing AOSP Keyboard with a much better keyboard and will carry over adding this feature to the new one too.<br/><br/>Android only permits the currently focused app and keyboard to read the clipboard. However, sensitive data often lingers around in the clipboard for a while and privacy invasive apps can read it. Android shows a notice for apps reading clipboard content set by other apps but by then it&#39;s too late.<br/><br/>Our approach is replacing the inherently problematic API-based clipboard access approach used by both desktop and mobile operating systems. It&#39;s another overhaul of the privacy model for apps similar to our Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes features. We have many of these privacy features planned. 2026-09-06T19:41:30Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq8ymvn7cq0mvzuaq4w3j2k6tp80xrta2y6m0vrap6n4cmugnqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygz3vwum We&#39;re well into the process of converting the Messaging app included in #GrapheneOS into a modern app. We&#39;ll be making a new release later today with a completely overhauled user interface written in Android Compose. We&#39;ve made a massive amount of other improvements and bug fixes beyond that too.<br/><br/>In the longer term, we plan to add support for RCS including support for the standard end-to-end encryption (E2EE) via Messaging Layer Security (MLS). Currently, RCS including E2EE is available on GrapheneOS via Google Messages. We want to avoid the need to use Google Messages for RCS eventually.<br/><br/>RCS on Android is currently implemented with code across the OS, Google Messages and Google Play services. Our plan is to start by making an equivalent to the portion in Google Messages. It would initially require sandboxed Google Play for RCS activation, etc. but we plan to implement that too..<br/><br/>RCS isn&#39;t an open platform in practice. It isn&#39;t even as open as SMS/MMS. It heavily depends on proprietary Google and carrier infrastructure in practice. We can start by replicating Google&#39;s approach and then we can work on only using carrier services for carriers where it&#39;s actually supported.<br/><br/>We&#39;re also going to be overhauling or fully replacing the rest of the AOSP apps in the near future. AOSP Gallery is incredibly outdated and is being entirely replaced. AOSP Keyboard may be similar. We recently hired a bunch of new people and will be hiring more so our progress will be accelerating.<br/><br/>In the past, our focus was nearly entirely on the base OS rather than bundled apps with alternatives available. We&#39;ve heavily ramped up the resources we&#39;re investing into the bundled apps. We&#39;ll also be scaling up our work on the base OS too. More donations will enable us to hire even more people. 2026-09-06T19:41:07Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqxwspxyyamhc4xz43llyt6pz3rfckvgsr29jkl49valdlwd9cprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg0gxcv5 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqql8e6su9nun9gp6papr5dmxccne393rlavgnjx0lvrwmp4uvsppemhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0paavuk'>nevent1q…avuk</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>It is opt-in. 2026-09-06T14:01:41Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqrxxw5zakgeaaed6q3awd267z09gu3nwxsqnfejpxc6dw3mggprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg07m4kq Latest GrapheneOS release implements automatic call recording.<br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsfs0pxzqh5day4qqke6j3rae8nfamsnama3seuyjklphtwdm3a09gpr9mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumt0d4hhxarj9ecxjmnt9upzpva683gyt7a0nxlfedx648ca0whwm2aql3dezkt9z830k7nsm4leqvzqqqqqqyujchwm" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…chwm</a></span> </div> GrapheneOS version 2026090500 released:<br/><br/><a href="https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026090500">https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026090500</a><br/><br/>See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.<br/><br/>Forum discussion thread:<br/><br/><a href="https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41757-grapheneos-version-2026090500-released">https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41757-grapheneos-version-2026090500-released</a><br/><br/>#GrapheneOS #privacy #security </blockquote> 2026-09-06T11:50:23Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqzrrs5gt8nzedf59edsz56lj5mp2pe92khkd4q8z6ggcqamgqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygereezs We&#39;ve been testing performance of MTE on the Pixel 11 using the Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 release adding back firmware support for it. MTE in asymmetric mode only has around 5% overhead in the standard benchmarks and other tests we&#39;ve done. That&#39;s more than good enough but we&#39;ve done limited tests.<br/><br/>Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 on the Pixel 11 force disables MTE for the OS from the firmware. Using it requires ignoring the arm64.nomte parameter being passed to the kernel. It still isn&#39;t clear why they&#39;re making the feature unavailable. SVE was also force disabled in Android 17 but not in QPR2 Beta 4.<br/><br/>Our initial testing indicates performance isn&#39;t substantially worse. The overhead may be higher but there was an incremental CPU performance with the Pixel 11 which should more than make up for it. However, MTE is unavailable with stable firmware and we&#39;re bypassing firmware disabling it for QPR2.<br/><br/>Multiple Google engineers we&#39;ve contacted have said they aren&#39;t able to give us any information about this so we&#39;re left doing reverse engineering and relying on leaks. The leaks do not seem reliable and do not match what we see. Our concern is that MTE may actually be broken due to CPU errata.<br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsqqqqtcwkmalemepulxhurep8ptunmsvyzwyurggpy39prghwwhzcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtczyzucmm2vat4zq7gdhjeux9qqdysqn56v07vj0s5xsddfnd6grfwzyqcyqqqqqqgdgz630" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…z630</a></span> </div> We have good news about the Pixel 11. It still has at least bare minimum support for MTE at a hardware level. We think they removed most of the hardware acceleration from the CPU cache to save money. They ruined the performance so it ended up being fully disabled in firmware. It may still be usable.<br/><br/>Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 was released on August 28th. It's the first Beta release with Pixel 11 support. MTE support is still completely disabled in the OS and arm64.nomte is unconditionally passed by the firmware to the kernel. The good news is the firmware itself had MTE support added back to it.<br/><br/>It's possible to enable reserving the tag memory for MTE via `fastboot oem mte on`, boot a non-stock kernel ignoring arm64.nomte and use MTE. We're in the process of determining whether it's fully functional and the performance characteristics. It's likely disabled due to performance being ruined.<br/><br/>We expect performance must be quite bad for Google to have decided to entirely strip out support for it in not only the software but also the firmware so that no would could even try to use it before Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4. That's a very strange thing to do. It's at least added back to firmware now.<br/><br/>We reached out to multiple people at Google asking about the MTE situation on the Pixel 11 prior to making our original thread and didn't receive any responses. We still don't know what's wrong with MTE on the Pixel 11. It isn't clear if there are serious CPU errata or it simply performs very badly.<br/><br/>If the issue is simply that MTE performance is poor, then we can support the Pixel 11 in #GrapheneOS with the major caveat that it will be a significant performance downgrade. Aside from MTE, Google downgraded the Pixel 11 series GPU compared to the Pixel 10 series in addition to reducing RAM for base Pro models.<br/><br/>Google has been increasingly silent in response to any communications since dropping Pixel support from AOSP with Android 16 in June 2025. They could have told us MTE performance was significantly reduced so they disabled it at launch but will add it back to firmware for QPR2. That's still unclear.<br/><br/>Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 releases for the Pixel 11 series were only uploaded around 10 hours ago rather than with the initial release on August 28th so this hasn't been available for very long. It wasn't missed by us or people who looked into it after our initial thread but rather wasn't out yet. </blockquote> 2026-09-02T04:41:12Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqtcwkmalemepulxhurep8ptunmsvyzwyurggpy39prghwwhzcprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg79kgvt We have good news about the Pixel 11. It still has at least bare minimum support for MTE at a hardware level. We think they removed most of the hardware acceleration from the CPU cache to save money. They ruined the performance so it ended up being fully disabled in firmware. It may still be usable.<br/><br/>Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 was released on August 28th. It&#39;s the first Beta release with Pixel 11 support. MTE support is still completely disabled in the OS and arm64.nomte is unconditionally passed by the firmware to the kernel. The good news is the firmware itself had MTE support added back to it.<br/><br/>It&#39;s possible to enable reserving the tag memory for MTE via `fastboot oem mte on`, boot a non-stock kernel ignoring arm64.nomte and use MTE. We&#39;re in the process of determining whether it&#39;s fully functional and the performance characteristics. It&#39;s likely disabled due to performance being ruined.<br/><br/>We expect performance must be quite bad for Google to have decided to entirely strip out support for it in not only the software but also the firmware so that no would could even try to use it before Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4. That&#39;s a very strange thing to do. It&#39;s at least added back to firmware now.<br/><br/>We reached out to multiple people at Google asking about the MTE situation on the Pixel 11 prior to making our original thread and didn&#39;t receive any responses. We still don&#39;t know what&#39;s wrong with MTE on the Pixel 11. It isn&#39;t clear if there are serious CPU errata or it simply performs very badly.<br/><br/>If the issue is simply that MTE performance is poor, then we can support the Pixel 11 in #GrapheneOS with the major caveat that it will be a significant performance downgrade. Aside from MTE, Google downgraded the Pixel 11 series GPU compared to the Pixel 10 series in addition to reducing RAM for base Pro models.<br/><br/>Google has been increasingly silent in response to any communications since dropping Pixel support from AOSP with Android 16 in June 2025. They could have told us MTE performance was significantly reduced so they disabled it at launch but will add it back to firmware for QPR2. That&#39;s still unclear.<br/><br/>Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 releases for the Pixel 11 series were only uploaded around 10 hours ago rather than with the initial release on August 28th so this hasn&#39;t been available for very long. It wasn&#39;t missed by us or people who looked into it after our initial thread but rather wasn&#39;t out yet. 2026-09-01T06:12:54Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq0v8546aldphpqlryg22q9dhah8ak6vcqtmgh5yjaq6mg2kdsprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg997rkt In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqnjerdl0wne0hu7ezs2284c9uf920tq9q6r5gf5v0k6g4wvwq9cgpzamhxue69uhkummnw3ezuwpcd4cxstnvd9nx2tch6ad7p'>nevent1q…ad7p</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>See my previous posts on here 2026-08-30T22:56:47Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsf3c7vc4sa260k8yuhkp84zmgs82g2hwusc3jlsyny42w9jyu0u2sprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg0jvyj0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqq92vthfmj5m4ee7y0r85lest06nk6sejg8v0jlzz8l2sgzlecd7ypzx'>nevent1q…ypzx</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>For a closer overview, not adding MTE saves CPU die space, and slight extra hardware which likely saved around a dollar per phone. Like any big tech company their motivations are capitalism. There&#39;s a market of AI and they want to compete in commercialising it like OpenAI and Anthropic are leading at.<br/><br/>The world is a far more boring and uninteresting place than people would like to think and mega companies are in bed with making the most profit. They&#39;d oppose the government if it went against their growth.<br/><br/>These scenarios of a company that can&#39;t even keep secrets of how their next phone is going to look somehow hiding a security flaw open to billions of people to try and discover is silly. We had an insider tip this would happen but their predicted date was late. Cellebrite has a fraction of the money and shreds almost every Android phone open, and it is a commercially available product developed by people with Twitter accounts you can talk to right now.<br/><br/>Situations would have to imply we live in a very controlled world where the authorities are smart and every single other person is not. <br/><br/> 2026-08-30T22:43:44Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqw4gykxuk2y5lza83hmum76aa6xh8cc33zj4jqpcy8xzrkcnsprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyglx96t9 Near the end of May 2026, Russia began filtering access to DataPacket IP space with an enforced domain allowlist for HTTP and TLS SNI. #GrapheneOS services aren&#39;t on the allowlist so we had to switch from DataPacket Frankfurt to Cherry Servers Amsterdam for Russia. That&#39;s now getting filtered too.<br/><br/>We&#39;ve fixed it again by using Zare London for connections from Russia instead. That&#39;s the final of our sponsored servers in Europe we can use so we&#39;ll need to fall back to Xenyth Toronto if they filter it. We&#39;re using our own IP space in Toronto so it should work unless they specifically block us.<br/><br/>We don&#39;t think we&#39;ll be blocked directly but we&#39;re also unlikely to get placed on the allowlist. That means our services are gradually going to become inaccessible in Russia via the IP space of major cloud services. Our own IP space will still work fine and we don&#39;t host any VPN services ourselves.<br/><br/>Our website, OS updates, app repository, connectivity checks, network time, network-based location, geocoding and other main services should work again in Russia. It&#39;s likely they&#39;ll expand to filtering Zare&#39;s IP space and then we&#39;ll have to use Toronto where we have our own non-anycast IPv4 /24.<br/><br/>They use a domain blocklist for most of the internet and an allowlist for many VPS and dedicated server hosting providers to block access to VPN services. It&#39;s likely they&#39;ll expand to enforcing an allowlist for every major server hosting provider. That&#39;s far more aggressive than China&#39;s filtering.<br/><br/>Our authoritative DNS is hosted via 2 anycast networks using our own ASN and IP space so it hasn&#39;t been impacted by this. It&#39;s likely we can avoid it for the rest of our services by using our own IP space. If they start filtering netcup IP space, we can make a reverse proxy to those from Toronto.<br/><br/>If our services are blocked, connectivity checks can also be set to Standard rather than Disabled to use the Google servers. That&#39;ll keep automatic selection of networks with internet working along with automatic captive portal handling and JobSceduler not assuming every network has internet access. 2026-08-30T22:13:16Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq02erk4u9mtskph535vlewmpmm9e4eh4k2cmv7mn327s8dtjcprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg8e86kk Searching &#39;MTE&#39; on Twitter to see countless established security researchers shocked at the Pixel 11. Clear example on how to alienate a community. 2026-08-30T21:57:47Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqrxwhhn7elexwv50u358dxl2qhzcr4svdxscgyazjw6tm3kuqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygyhylwa In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0rp6a67jyuupy90acwyf6vmqvqeyy9qjprqudxn28zk4puw0leaspzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtch7wha8'>nevent1q…wha8</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>2027. We will make announcements on our progress with Motorola when appropriate. 2026-08-30T20:41:22Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqtkp80zkvtzkxn7slnx6mauqvksnfvxpf0r2kffn7a8tzmkdqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygvnfytg In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsfwdty2xzhelu4tjy5y8zz707f8rns6u0sygq33fz2wwz6akkj3tgpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc6uhesz'>nevent1q…hesz</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>They can connect to GrapheneOS services again without one, providing they don&#39;t choose to block GrapheneOS directly. 2026-08-30T20:39:50Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqq9y677eyjc7lga6q9nuy3tm03a5kk8pgy4m6sypnwxp43jdqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg2kfw8q In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstuqky882x0msyr6pqyzj3djq2nmn877lypzk3mlrfujtfkxxd5dspzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtc3r4kk9'>nevent1q…4kk9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>There will be support for Motorola devices in the future as per our partnership announcement. With MTE coming into Snapdragon processors more they could open up the walls for other devices even without our initial involvement. 2026-08-30T20:27:22Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqzux8umn065cjsyp32z20975mudaykuy3mrje80hdxt8pl3zcprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg0wzcjj In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsgmmk5e7ncg2gztpgw5c4jmyw6n3ad33c2vvltapd5w32fw26v6espzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtca7n7ww'>nevent1q…n7ww</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>I use Bitrefill and get no crashes, although I see I enabled JIT in the past. Would need to use it more. Will see if others can reproduce. 2026-08-30T20:23:06Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqquww0p80cq9c3y4xm94jdsfhrg3663pexfw6dpke0prek4hqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygqpvqcx We are advising people to NOT buy the 11th Generation Pixels due to removal of hardware memory tagging (MTE), a crucial security feature used in GrapheneOS since their introduction on the Pixel 8. Either use a previous generation or wait for the first Motorola devices with GrapheneOS. We have not determined what to do about this.<br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqsyn3f8pfatuu76q5rg4vnzsrnmn83yrg02y3tvvy3jp3dalvdm8nspr9mhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumt0d4hhxarj9ecxjmnt9upzpva683gyt7a0nxlfedx648ca0whwm2aql3dezkt9z830k7nsm4leqvzqqqqqqy8uc5hy" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…c5hy</a></span> </div> We have a partial port of GrapheneOS to the Pixel 11 series after a week of work on it. We're unable to complete the port due to lack of support for ARM hardware memory tagging in software, firmware and near certainly hardware. It appears Google cut an important security feature to save money. </blockquote> 2026-08-29T18:56:31Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqs2dzh5szfzc3cayvn5l7r4uvhh5tgspup7rat30m9crct78g4vmvcprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg6gymal In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswv7mtx9av2ult9rauegegfykwcv9een7afpd3c9m43ynxl2964rqsrcusd'>nevent1q…cusd</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Not without some weird hacky method I don&#39;t know about. It&#39;s a developer feature so you can consider it incomplete. <br/><br/> 2026-08-29T10:56:03Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqz3d9npjq3n65jp2322xcufv0wx2qhsvhanhuwcapn896qjtsprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg24avds In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdwfezszndrsn8hh66hwy3fqmy2lmftk6tag2he3g8sgpu2ptxtwqpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuct60fsk6mewdejhgtc0yr62a'>nevent1q…r62a</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>None of their phones have that. I know the ThinkPhone exists but that was just a typical smartphone for enterprises. 2026-08-24T20:58:56Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqqvz4zm7u62hvrnvy94lsx03yekurksr6wfxepk42c06ru247cprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg5u4u60 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqx6qmrpppzpkxrvcf0yd5nkayl8tcfjvltmw5sh0vw6fdh8ya42gpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcxcdacl'>nevent1q…dacl</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Motorola Mobility (Lenovo). 2026-08-24T09:55:22Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq99tefthtktqjvypathj4ye7gxhrna3vusgjc7a5enh42vhdcprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygk7ypnx In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqttwn8swdvg7euh594t2fe6vd808tygatzry4pf9ary7ea4tvdpcpzamhxue69uhhyetvv9ujuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgtcs77sjj'>nevent1q…7sjj</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Like most vendors it&#39;s from when the device is first released. GrapheneOS users will be familiar with that since Pixels work like this with 7 years of updates from launch. 2026-08-22T22:08:26Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsqqqq2qmmpk3fsqhqsz39d0ff5w077yduv78w6qtsktt4t7l5jkjqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg67w5j5 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdq8wc5wn57v4gm2vzqclvq2877saakyfz038srrnwk7egavh9fucpzemhxue69uhhyetvv9ujumn0wd68ytnwv46z7s9dtxp'>nevent1q…dtxp</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The Secure in this instance means a place that is difficult to get out of or escape from, rather than the digital security itself. The purpose is to store sensitive data away from the OS so it is not compromised if the OS is. There are many secure elements that have poor security, like your standard dedicated desktop &#39;TPM&#39;. 2026-08-22T16:34:38Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsztklm4kaajjhwadkkppdd7k6zhwxr0x2e7cq253h0dtlgcpgtqasprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg2ng9q0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqycjvkqqwaqj2nl9snp366rhn07nf3f3y2eu4xtx5uel74ktcsppamhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0yq2c3ckx'>nevent1q…3ckx</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>2. It&#39;s a Google / AOSP issue they deliberately hold back patches to critical / high vulnerabilities for over a month. It&#39;s also an issue of the OEMs who have these early access but don&#39;t issue all the patches. GrapheneOS Security Preview does. <br/><br/> 2026-06-07T09:11:33Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsgh558zd88e2mr3axsu3cg2wl8fj0z05a6jweexh2wafqg8nct0tqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygx68qfe In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqycjvkqqwaqj2nl9snp366rhn07nf3f3y2eu4xtx5uel74ktcsppamhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0yq2c3ckx'>nevent1q…3ckx</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>OEMs get early access to the patches and are allowed to push them on their OS, but no one does them all. Google and Samsung do a small amount of them. Since they are embargoed and not open source immediately, they aren&#39;t released into AOSP until months later with their scheduled security patch level. <br/><br/> 2026-06-07T09:06:54Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqs0f625pwr4cez7k9qaq4058208d8fayvy3pv5tz4hdk6qrzgdnlcqprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuyg9ly5af Molly (hardened Signal client) is building a Signal server software called Flatline. This will allow creating Signal deployments with servers that aren&#39;t Signal&#39;s. They&#39;ll also be working on features such as supporting accounts without phone numbers. <br/><blockquote class="border-l-05rem border-l-strongpink border-solid"><div class="-ml-4 bg-gradient-to-r from-gray-100 dark:from-zinc-800 to-transparent mr-0 mt-0 mb-4 pl-4 pr-2 py-2">quoting <br/><span itemprop="mentions" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Article"><a itemprop="url" href="/nevent1qqszx8t5wg6e7jy36ztvzg0760vud6zxq353722djwwzljg3e2p0j2czypm4ffmkz5zumvgz369ynkd7kchyp9kdv6n2r4zmdw5x9p7r85gdjqcyqqqqqqgl6w4tr" class="bg-lavender dark:prose:text-neutral-50 dark:text-neutral-50 dark:bg-garnet px-1">nevent1q…w4tr</a></span> </div> As some of you may know, we're building Flatline, a self‑hostable soft fork of the Signal Server. It lets you run a mostly Signal‑compatible server for research and private deployments.<br/><br/>We already run a Flatline server in Bahnhof cloud for internal development.<br/><br/>#Signal #mollyim #flatline </blockquote> 2026-06-06T19:27:53Z https://njump.me/nevent1qqsg9qcks0dqft04fty3dgc228dtzlm2yzd6gdpdevqgxdkrxay6sjgprfmhxue69uhhjmn0wd68ytnev9jkctnpwshhgctwvahsyg9e3hk5e6h2ypusm09ncv2qq6fqp8f5clueylpgdq66nxm5sxjuygumwrym In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqp2d8guku0pk8zkqpk2zs9m76r9zjpk05am338f9eprz9acx9qppamhxue69uhkummn9ekx7mp0yqm4qzst'>nevent1q…qzst</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The big issue that the post is trying to address is that AOSP and therefore derivatives like LineageOS are also missing these patches for up to 6 months. When OEMs get security preview patches, they may only push ~10% of them earlier than their assigned date too. When switching you could be *less* patched, and it is the upstream&#39;s fault.<br/><br/>GrapheneOS on the security preview channel is the ONLY Android distribution delivering all available patches on a regular basis. Despite the embargo preventing releasing the sources, it is easy to use reverse engineering tools to compare differences between standard and security preview builds to find the vulnerability AND the embargo doesn&#39;t protect against a resourceful threat actor somehow getting that access. <br/><br/> 2026-06-06T13:42:00Z