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npub1htplhx4cgnny8v3nnh9drjtcrx5kg4yu5suexrq7wltmke50n9wsu9axzv

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nprofile1qqst4slmn2uyfejrkgeemjk3e9upn2ty2jw2gwvnps0804amv68ejhgpzpmhxue69uhkummnw3ezuamfdejszynhwden5te0wp6hyurvv4cxzeewv4eszrthwden5te0dehhxtnvdakqzxrhwden5te0wpex2mtfw4kjuurjd9kkzmpwdejhgqg5waehxw309aex2mrp0yhxgctdw4eju6t0qyg8wumn8ghj7mn0wd68ytnvv9hxgnt9a93

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Last Notes

2026-10-22 07:38:01 UTC

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I think Trump is simply acting selfishly. In the past, weapons deliveries helped strengthen the U.S. arms industry, and now the United States needs oil from Russia. These are probably the main factors determining whether Russia will sell oil to the United States.

2026-09-21 13:29:25 UTC

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Got some professional help from someone of the team:
Gas is paid on-chain when a channel is opened, closed or rebalanced. The swaps inside the channel are off-chain state updates, so there's no per-trade gas. "Gas-free trading" is the accurate version, not "gas-free" when you include channel openings/withdrawals.
Threat model, short version:
• Who signs: you. Your keys and the Lightning/Lithium node run in your browser. Every channel state update is co-signed by both sides, so the hub can't move your balance on its own. Cross-chain swaps are HTLCs: either both legs settle or both refund after the timelock.
• Who watches: you while you're online; otherwise watchtowers
• What breaks when the browser dies: a swap in flight doesn't settle and falls back to refund after the timelock. Channel funds stay recoverable with your seed plus channel-state backup. The real risk is being offline without watchtower coverage while a counterparty tries to publish an old state. That's the same trade-off as Lightning generally.
Happy to go deeper on any of these.

2026-09-21 12:46:08 UTC

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Have you heard of Hydranet?
They’ve developed their own Lightning solution for other EVM-compatible chains, enabling gas-free cross-chain swaps. The whole thing runs through the browser and sets up your own Lightning node, while watchtowers are used to monitor the channels.
In the future, it will be possible to swap stablecoins in a completely decentralized, non-custodial way.
https://docs.hydranet.ai/welcome

2026-09-06 06:28:10 UTC

How to Capture Bitcoin Mining
Make Bitcoin mining unprofitable through sustained price pressure and lower transaction fees. Buy up mining machines using debt, then continue operating the mining capacity at a loss until other mining operators are forced out of the market.

2026-09-06 06:07:12 UTC

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True, English is not my main language, but I rewrote it until it reflected the arguments I wanted to make.

2026-09-05 20:19:30 UTC

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I wouldn’t be so certain about that.
Bitcoin is valuable because it is decentralized, censorship-resistant, and supply-limited, and that is exactly what BIP110 prioritizes. In today’s Bitcoin ecosystem, mining is dominated by a small number of public mining pools.
Global tensions could increasingly create pressure to comply with censorship requirements, and publicly traded mining companies may find it particularly difficult to resist such pressure.
The security of the Bitcoin network is not determined solely by the amount of computational power securing it. It also depends on how many mining machines are actually available and how widely they are distributed among independent participants. If 100% of the machines were widely and independently distributed, the network would be much more resilient. But if only 70% of the available machines were operating while the remaining 30% were sitting on the market and could potentially be acquired by a single actor, the network would become more vulnerable to attack.
In that sense, a new coin using a different proof-of-work algorithm is not necessarily much less secure simply because it has less total hash power.
There is also the issue of custody in today’s Bitcoin. A very large amount of Bitcoin is held in custodial arrangements without any cryptographic guarantee that all of the underlying Bitcoin actually exists. Rehypothecation could create additional synthetic supply and put downward pressure on the price.
If a competing chain could demonstrate that its transactions cannot be censored, that it has a larger and more decentralized network of independently operated nodes, and that a greater percentage of its coins are held in self-custody, it could potentially lead to more transactions taking place directly on-chain. This would generate higher transaction fees. Higher fee revenue would give network protectors more money to continue doing so and make the network less dependent on publicly traded dept companies.
With all of these factors combined, such a chain would absolutely have a legitimate reason to exist.
In that scenario, it could serve as a kind of escape valve, a credible alternative for users if Bitcoin turns out to be more captured or centralized than it currently appears to be.

2026-08-21 05:29:26 UTC

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Do you have proof that no pool started mining on the BIP110 side when mandatory signaling began? On your livestream, you said that Foundry miners weren’t getting any jobs. What if that was because they had switched sides? Foundry can’t afford to lose blocks, and by mining on Antpool’s side, they would have had over 50% of the hashrate. @nprofile…fg0n
#nevent1q…mhvp

2026-08-20 04:57:57 UTC

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It’s not so simple. Your self-interest as a miner is to serve as many people as possible, as this results in a higher price and more fees. If you fork 20% off, even if it were possible not to, you’re somehow hurting yourself.
You can argue that there wasn’t enough capital or enough companies on the BIP110 side. And it’s true that, in that case, 20% wasn’t enough to change Bitcoin.
But if things were a little different, then sure, a minority could change Bitcoin.

2026-08-19 18:37:39 UTC

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It’s not proven that my theory is true, but I think it is quite possible.
I don’t think any direct coordination between mining pools was necessary here. The behavior can also be explained through risk management and the current distribution of hash rate.
The two largest pools together control more than 50% of the total hash rate. In such a situation, smaller pools have very little real influence. For them, it is rational to wait and observe how the dominant pools position themselves, rather than taking on significant risk themselves.
My assumption is that Foundry may have initially started on the BIP-110 side, but after Antpool’s decisive block reassessed the situation and moved toward the economically safer chain. As a large company with shareholders, the room for risky decisions is limited, especially when they could lead to substantial losses. This is also why soft forks generally work: a chain split is worse for everyone in Bitcoin, so miners are incentivized to converge on a single chain. However, in this case Antpool effectively triggered a split, and from that point on it became clear that one side would lose everything.
Foundry likely did not have the risk tolerance to continue in an uncertain direction, and by moving to continue on Antpool’s side they ended up with over 50%, making that path the safe choice. That said, there is no proof that Foundry actually started on BIP-110 at all; it is also possible they simply paused until the situation became clear.
In both cases, what stands out is that a configuration where two pools control over 50% of the hash rate leads to distorted outcomes. And that is exactly the structural issue that needs to be improved.

2026-08-13 19:27:11 UTC

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If the first block during mandatory signaling had been a BIP110 block, I think there was a real possibility the network would have followed it.
Foundry wasn’t mining at the moment of the split, which is one reason the next block on both sides took so long. My speculation is that Foundry may initially have been on the BIP110 side. After seeing Antpool, the largest pool, mine on the other side, they may have stopped rather than risk mining against it, and then switched.
That’s what the BIP110 side got wrong. The whole concept was based on miners not wanting to risk a split, but they didn’t consider what would happen if the first block was on the other side. They assumed other miners would want to override it and mine a BIP110 block. But in this scenario, miners instead stop mining to avoid risking a split. So everything comes down to mandatory signaling. The more support there is, the higher the chance of mining on a given chain.

2026-08-12 11:38:03 UTC

If Bitcoin is captured and millions are being spent to influence it, splitting a significant group of users onto a competing chain could turn out to be one of the worst decisions for those trying to maintain that control.
A competing chain creates a real-world test. If price suppression, rehypothecation, or other forms of capture actually exist, the alternative chain could attract more capital by offering stronger monetary properties.
If the capture thesis is wrong, the competing chain may simply lose relevance.
But if it is right, the split could expose exactly what the capture was supposed to hide.

2026-08-11 20:08:53 UTC

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Don’t try to capture Bitcoin. You’ll just lose money.

2026-08-11 20:06:34 UTC

The most powerful thing about Bitcoin is that you can always fork it.
If Bitcoin ever becomes truly captured, users can fork the system, change the rules, or even change the PoW algorithm and rebuild outside the captured structure.
Someone can spend enormous amounts of money trying to capture the chain, only to watch the network evolve around their control and make that power irrelevant.
Then the market decides.
The chain with more self-custody, more independent nodes, more decentralized mining, no money creation, less rehypothecation, and no group able to enrich itself through control of the protocol has the stronger monetary properties.
Capital will ultimately flow toward the system people trust most.
I don’t think Bitcoin is fully captured today, but we are seeing tendencies.
A Bitcoin chain can be captured.
The idea of Bitcoin cannot.

2026-08-11 18:39:10 UTC

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I don’t support BIP110 in the sense that I would sell my real Bitcoin. But until BIP110 is proven to be unsafe or unsustainable, I will hold my coins on both chains.
In the long run, I believe the chain that is more decentralized, where more people choose self-custody instead of rehypothecation, and where nobody can enrich themselves by changing the rules will gain more value.
I’m open to both chains. I also know that Bitcoin Core and mining on the real Bitcoin have a lot of room for improvement. Time will show which chain better preserves what makes Bitcoin valuable.

2026-08-11 10:22:50 UTC

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This has nothing to do with that. When mining is centralized and two pools control over 50% of the hashrate, smaller pools are effectively forced to follow the big ones.
Miners get paid by users through transaction fees. Yet they willingly cut off around 20% of their potential fee-paying users just to push them out of the network, hurting both themselves and Bitcoin in the process.
With BIP110 activated, no one using Bitcoin as money would have been pushed out of the network.

2026-08-10 18:18:15 UTC

There is a minority in Bitcoin that has spent years building tools to make Bitcoin more decentralized.
They built @nprofile…wpe4 to decentralize mining and block-template construction. They built simple, accessible node hardware so more people could validate Bitcoin themselves and have a voice in the network @nprofile…xmmy They even rented hashrate and pointed it toward smaller pools to reduce mining centralization.
Then on Saturday, five major mining pools chose a path that forked this minority off, despite having the option to keep them on the network.
That choice should have consequences.
Exiting Bitcoin is not the answer.
Now is the time to use the decentralization tools that have already been built.
Move hashrate away from dominant pools. Mine through smaller, more decentralized options. Run your own node. Construct your own block templates. Support infrastructure that reduces our dependence on a handful of mining pools.
The response should be to make those five pools less important.
Compete against them. Take hashrate away from them. Reduce their influence.
If mining pools make decisions that damage the network, we should make them feel the economic consequences.

2026-08-10 17:50:00 UTC

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I agree with “don’t fork off,” but in my view there are serios problems with centralisation.
10–15% of nodes explicitly supported the soft fork, while 0% rejected its blocks under the existing consensus rules. The rest simply didn’t signal support.
Yet miners proactively chose the path that forked those users off, even though they didn’t have to.
How else are we supposed to measure consensus? Does one large exchange saying “yes” suddenly matter more than thousands of independent nodes?
Non-signaling is not rejection.
The most objective signal we have is the rules nodes actually enforce. And there was no consensus-rule rejection of the soft-fork chain.
To me, this exposes a serious centralization problem in mining. A small number of large pools collectively chose a path that removed 10–15% of nodes/users and their potential fee revenue, despite a compatible path being available.
So what incentives or coordination made that outcome preferable? Social pressure? Money? Politics? Or simply a misunderstanding of the incentives?
A chain split hurts everyone in Bitcoin. It fragments users, liquidity, infrastructure, and economic activity. That was clear before it happened.
So the question I still have is: why did so many influential voices prefer the split over a compatible path that could have kept the network together?

2026-08-09 14:47:27 UTC

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In the livestream, Bitcoin Mechanic said that he received a message from a Foundry miner saying they weren’t getting any jobs. That could explain why it took Foundry so long to mine a block they had simply stopped mining.
My speculation is that Foundry initially started mining on the BIP110 side, but then changed course after seeing Antpool’s block.

2026-08-09 14:16:16 UTC

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Maybe if the block had come from a smaller pool, they wouldn’t have stopped. But once they saw that it came from the biggest pool, they stopped.

2026-08-09 14:14:54 UTC

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Yes, and after seeing Antpool’s block, they stopped.

2026-08-09 14:05:17 UTC

Did Foundry stop mining as soon as mandatory signaling started, or only after Antpool found the first block?
It would be interesting to know whether Foundry initially signaled BIP110 and then, after seeing Antpool’s block, pivoted, stopped mining, and waited or whether they stopped right when mandatory signaling began. It’s possible that it was simply chance that determined which chain won.
I’m still unsure why they didn’t prevent a chain split.

2026-08-09 10:53:41 UTC

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If the soft fork had succeeded, there wouldn’t be two chains.
By splitting the chain, Bitcoin as a whole loses: capital is divided, we lose a competing node implementation, and the network’s monetary force is weakened.
No matter which side you support, splitting Bitcoin into two competing networks makes both weaker than one unified network.
From that standpoint, miners chose to hurt themselves instead of moving forward with a single chain. Why?

2026-08-08 17:48:37 UTC

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We can’t predict the time horizon, but ultimately, the most decentralized Bitcoin will win. Bitcoin as an invention is here to stay, and there is no way to enrich yourself by manipulating the protocol rules. The chain with the most economic value will be the one where nobody can steal from others.

2026-08-08 09:49:19 UTC

Probably the best listen for understanding the debate and preparing for today’s event. It explains what could happen and why.
https://youtu.be/-or58xeQeXU

2026-08-08 06:55:02 UTC

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Did you read this?
https://x.com/oomahq/status/2085717166884618584

2026-08-08 06:28:36 UTC

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As I see it, the big pools face a real risk if they don’t signal. By playing it safe and only starting to signal once mandatory signaling begins, they gain an advantage over all the smaller pools.
#nevent1q…5csj

2026-08-08 06:05:45 UTC

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Guilty. Mine are closed. I’m ready for the showdown.

2026-08-08 04:01:55 UTC

My prediction for today:
Small miners can’t really decide on BIP110 themselves; they have to follow the big miners.
If either Foundry or Antpool flips the bit while the other doesn’t, the one that doesn’t could be in serious trouble. If both flip it, they’re safe. In that case, they would benefit from mining blocks with less competition for some time, until the smaller miners catch up and follow them. On top of that, by flipping the bit, they serve 100% of nodes.
With the majority of the hashrate, the BIP110 chain will grow faster and overwrite legacy blocks. No permanent chain split, and all economic value remains on one chain.
I think both Antpool and Foundry will flip the bit. In that case, they can’t really lose. They benefit from less competition until all miners converge on one chain.
There will probably be a temporary split until all miners start signaling BIP110.

2026-08-07 18:46:46 UTC

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I agree. If there were actually a permanent close to 50/50 chain split, that would obviously be bad. But in our case, the incentives are aligned for miners to avoid that, and they can do so, because BIP110’s rules are compatible with all older nodes. If they weren’t compatible with older nodes, it would be a disaster.
It also doesn’t activate out of nowhere. There are close to two weeks of preparation for each activation period, which makes a sustained near-50/50 split very unlikely.
The way we’re doing it now, the incentives are aligned for miners to upgrade. More signaling is obviously better, but in this case, the threshold doesn’t really matter because it activates even without reaching it.
It’s good to see how Bitcoin works under different conditions. This is the only way to see how we can secure it when it comes under attack.

2026-08-07 05:44:19 UTC

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Does this have something to do with BIP110?

2026-08-07 05:35:42 UTC

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It’s a UASF. The threshold doesn’t matter because it activates anyway. They considered it an emergency and tried to activate it as early as possible. A 55% threshold puts more pressure on miners. With a 95% threshold, a miner with 6% could simply wait and wouldn’t have to worry about early activation. Miners will try to avoid a chain split at all costs. If signaling reached 55%, it’s very likely it would have quickly gone above 95% as well. But anyway, today is the activation date, so the threshold doesn’t change anything.

2026-08-04 18:07:10 UTC

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Maybe he was exploiting it slowly so nobody noticed, and now AI found it.

2026-07-29 17:40:37 UTC

What if the allegations against Adam Back were true, and the mining operation was in fact a Ponzi scheme? The implications could be significant. If many developers associated with Bitcoin Core, companies, or other prominent figures had lent money to finance that operation, Adam’s inability to repay those loans could expose them to substantial financial losses. In the worst case, some companies could face serious financial distress or even insolvency.
Under that hypothetical scenario, one possible explanation for the strong opposition to BIP110 would be that they believe Blockstream’s Simplicity smart contract project could generate enough value to help close that financial gap. If BIP110 were to succeed, there might be no realistic way to recover those funds.

2026-07-27 16:15:48 UTC

Almost everyone loses unless BIP110 activates without a chain split.
For leveraged companies with significant debt, opposing BIP110 without a successful URSF is like shooting themselves in the foot. A split would divide capital between two chains, reduce miner revenue, put downward pressure on Bitcoin’s price, increase the risk of a leverage cascade, create technical challenges for Lightning, add operational costs for exchanges, and damage Bitcoin’s reputation.
Every company operating in the Bitcoin ecosystem stands to lose from that outcome. So why are they pushing so hard against BIP110? If Bitcoin is used as money, most users wouldn’t even notice whether BIP110 activates. But everyone would notice the consequences of a chain split. So what do they believe they would lose if BIP110 activates?

2026-07-26 22:05:33 UTC

The best outcome for everyone would be for BIP110 to activate without a chain split. If that happens, it would still be possible to revisit the change in a year.
The opponents of BIP110 failed to build enough momentum for a URSF. Instead of engaging with the concerns raised about the changes introduced in Bitcoin Core v30, many dissenting voices were ignored, blocked, or dismissed. This is the result of that approach.
For leveraged companies, promoting opposition that could lead to a chain split is a highly risky strategy.
I’m prepared for any outcome. If the Bitcoin price drops significantly, i don’t care. Whether every company or miner can afford such a scenario is another question.
I’m ready and have no reason to be anxious. My bitcoin is in cold storage and secure.
At what point leveraged companies will realize this, I don’t know. But for their own sake, I hope they do before it’s too late.

2026-07-26 21:53:11 UTC

With over 15% of the network’s nodes, the longer it takes for a block to be found on the BIP110 chain, the higher the transaction fees rise. That attracts more miners, increasing the risk of the other chain being wiped out. Don’t be fooled by debt-ridden companies. They don’t pay you, they simply benefit from Bitcoin’s price appreciation. But in the event of a chain split, they would likely have the most to lose if the price falls. It seems they underestimated the risks. If they don’t reconsider their opposition, they may end up paying the highest price.

2026-07-26 19:10:55 UTC

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*Failed to build momentum for a URSF

2026-07-24 07:36:36 UTC

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We have a war in Bitcoin, largely caused by Core’s misdirection. How is it that all the major companies ended up giving even more money to the same organization that funded Core during the period when it was moving in the wrong direction?

2026-07-23 15:27:50 UTC

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I think that once the major AI companies start trying to match their expenses with their revenue, many people will want to buy their own local AI setup instead. My suspicion is that this transition will take much longer than we expect.

2026-07-23 14:59:19 UTC

It’s interesting to watch. Core supporters seem to appear out of nowhere every few weeks. Once their arguments are debunked or their conflicts of interest become apparent, they disappear, only to be replaced by another new voice.
In contrast, the people supporting BIP110 have largely been the same individuals from the beginning, consistently making their case over time.

2026-07-17 06:02:07 UTC

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🇨🇭

2026-07-14 11:11:37 UTC

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The beautiful thing about Bitcoin is that it can become whatever people value most. The rules that attract the most capital, attract the most hash rate and therefore become Bitcoin. In a world where everything inflates, the rules that best protect capital from devaluation will win.
It can be messy, especially when people hold Bitcoin indirectly through stocks or funds and a single entity decides how that capital is used. But in the end, the concept of Bitcoin survives.
If you don’t trust the latest rules, take some money and move it to the fork you believe is safer for your capital. Put your money where you believe it is best protected. Don’t decide out of fear or follow the majority. In the end, that behavior is what drives Bitcoin’s evolution.

2026-07-13 10:59:58 UTC

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True, and I agree it’s the best shot we have. Bitcoin is not static. If there are several forks, the one people believe will be the best long-term store of value will become Bitcoin, because it attracts the most capital and therefore most miners. If BIP110 fails, a chain optimized for more than just money will become Bitcoin. That’s not the chain I trust. At that point I will diversify more. If we eventually have a truly decentralized chain focused only on being money, I will go all in again. That’s how Bitcoin works. Incentives decide which chain becomes the best money and therefore Bitcoin.

2026-07-13 10:28:29 UTC

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Before the Blocktrainer went full Saylor fanboy, he argued that Ethereum only pretends to be decentralized. His point was that it’s actually better to have a centralized system where everyone knows who controls it and who has the power to change it, rather than a system that gradually centralizes while nobody knows who is really in control.
I see Bitcoin the same way. If, at such an early stage, ordinary users can’t compete with corporate interests, then there are dangerous forces at work. Everything we value about Bitcoin could eventually be changed. Physical gold doesn’t carry that same governance risk.
It’s not that I’ve completely lost trust in Bitcoin. I just see a risk that, in my view, is growing. That’s why I plan to diversify more if BIP110 fails.

2026-07-13 10:15:55 UTC

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agree

2026-07-13 10:15:45 UTC

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physical gold and swiss franc

2026-07-13 07:31:29 UTC

If BIP110 fails, I will sell a portion of my Bitcoins. If corporate interests are valued more than those of the plebs, it means Bitcoin is not as decentralized as I believed, and I need to diversify more.
Corporate entities are driven to maximize shareholder value. They can’t simply sell if a chain split happens.
On top of that, there is no technical opposition in form of a URSF to BIP110. If miners understand this, there will be no chain split.

2026-07-09 17:54:15 UTC

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That’s true. That was the original intention they stated. However, after the overwhelming backlash, there were other ways to address the issue. For example, the outcome could have been achieved by simply limiting OP_RETURN at the consensus level.
Especially given the entire fork discussion. If their primary concern had truly been protecting the Bitcoin network, they could have offered an alternative consensus fork that for example enforced just an OP_RETURN limit, especially after it became clear that most node operators did not support opening up OP_RETURN. That would have addressed the concerns around the miners while also taking much of the momentum away from BIP110.

2026-07-03 12:38:30 UTC

No major investor funds a business built around embedding arbitrary data into Bitcoin if that use case could disappear overnight. Core V30 changed those incentives by treating data on bitcoin as a feature to protect. That’s what BIP110 tries to solve. Sending that message is a powerful way to discourage future spam projects.

2026-06-04 19:49:30 UTC

I’ve been mining on my own node for the past month using rented hashpower from Braiins and directing it to Ocean with around 2 PH/s. I was fully prepared to lose a bit while supporting decentralization, but funnily I actually ended up making around $50.
To all the power seekers in Bitcoin: the plebs are coming. And on top of that, we’re even making money while doing it.
https://blossom.primal.net/f15dac75cbce00673943bfb988e62d9c1e032d4f083d8adea3e86c0f7b8ad4a9.png
https://blossom.primal.net/98c86a922597efed3836db914bbc2ea7ae72a17966a11b5a6b27397365e3a019.png

2026-06-01 17:52:43 UTC

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Another day, and once again more reasons not to blindly trust Bitcoin Core.

2026-05-31 10:44:21 UTC

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For Saylor, it’s grow or lose. If he can’t continue accumulating more Bitcoin, then why should somebody hold his stock?

2026-05-31 09:50:28 UTC

Actually, the fact that mining pools are so large may make it easier to carry out a UASF in practice.
If around 30% of the hashrate is controlled by a single pool, then even a relatively small shift can change the dynamics very quickly. For example, if at the beginning 20% of the hashrate is mining on the BIP110 side and Foundry mines two blocks in a row on the opposing chain, then Antpool switching its 30% to the BIP110 side could suddenly push the situation close to 50/50.
At that point, Foundry would face a real risk that the blocks it just mined could become invalid on the chain that eventually wins. Because miners are economically incentivized to avoid that risk, large pools may switch sides faster than many people expect.
So ironically, mining centralization may actually make a UASF easier to activate, because only a few large pools need to change behavior for pressure on the rest of the network to increase dramatically.